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An attentional blink (AB) paradigm was used to investigate the attentional resources necessary for visual
marking. The results showed that distractors presented inside the AB cannot easily be ignored despite
participants anticipating a future target display. This supports the hypothesis that attentional resources are
required for visual marking. In addition, probe dots were better detected on blinked distractors than on
successfully ignored distractors, but only when the task required new items to be prioritized. In a final
experiment, a stronger negative carry-over effect on search occurred for targets identical to distractors
presented outside rather than inside the AB. This suggests that at least part of the inhibitory processes
involved in visual marking are nonspatial.
The study of visual selective attention focuses on our visual
system’s ability to prioritize certain visual events over others. In
brief, efficient prioritization depends on the spatial and temporal
properties of, as well as the task constraints surrounding, the visual
event. In the present study, we considered the interactions between
these spatial and temporal factors.
Visual selective attention has a strong spatial component. Typ-
ically, visual objects relevant to our behavior (targets) occupy
limited spatial regions in a cluttered visual field filled with numer-
ous irrelevant objects (distractors) that are simultaneously present.
Sometimes selection of a target is quite effortless. For instance,
Treisman and Gelade (1980) found that observers were very effi-
cient in searching for a blue T in a display filled with brown Ts and
green Xs. In this single-feature search task it is as if the unique
feature (color) of the target guides selection. Typically, therefore,
the number of distractors (the display size) has little or no effect on
search reaction times (RTs), creating flat slopes for the Display
Size  RT search functions. In other tasks, selection may be more
effortful. For example, Treisman and Gelade found that search for
a green T among brown Ts and green Xs was much less efficient
than a single-feature search. In this conjunction search, visual
attention cannot be guided by the target because the target is
defined only by a combination of features it shares with both
distractor types. Instead, it is as if attention has to be shifted around
the display in an effortful way until the target is found. Typically,
therefore, conjunction-search RTs are dependent on the number of
items simultaneously present, resulting in a relatively steep search
slope (see Wolfe, 1994, and Wolfe, Cave, & Franzel, 1989; for
variations; but see Duncan & Humphreys, 1989, for a different
explanation).
Visual selective attention also has a strong temporal component.
Visual objects occupy limited periods in time as they appear and
disappear continuously, for example, when objects (such as cars
and birds) move into our environment, when we ourselves move
around and previously occluded objects emerge, or when individ-
ual objects come into existence more abruptly (such as blinking
traffic lights, or a camouflaged bird jumping out of a bush). One of
the interesting aspects of visual attention is its ability to anticipate
the selection of future events. Anticipation of new objects may
occur in several ways. One way is to create an attentional set that
biases the processing of visual properties in future stimuli. For
instance, Folk and colleagues (Folk, Remington, & Johnston,
1992; Folk, Remington, & Wright, 1994) found evidence that
observers create a broad attentional set for the target properties in
a visual search task in anticipation of the target’s appearance.
Thus, any other objects (distractors) in the visual field that also
correspond to that attentional set capture visual attention, even
when the target has not appeared yet. For example, Folk et al.
(1992) asked participants to look for a color-defined target in a
visual search display. However, just before the target emerged, a
cue was presented, which, in one particular condition, was 100%
invalid (i.e., it always appeared in a different position to the
target). Folk et al. (1992) found that these cues had an adverse
effect on target detection RTs but only if the cue was defined by
color as well. When the cue was defined by an abrupt onset, no RT
cost was found. The complementary effect was also found: When
the target was defined by an abrupt onset, onset cues interfered
with performance but color cues did not. This provides strong
evidence for the ability of people to anticipate what they expect to
be the target by enhancing broadly tuned visual channels important
for target detection (Folk et al., 1994).
Another way to facilitate the selection of new items is to
suppress the properties of current (old) stimuli through inhibitory
processes. One such inhibitory mechanism, termed visual marking,
was proposed by Watson and Humphreys (1997; see also Olivers,
Watson, & Humphreys, 1999; Watson & Humphreys, 1998, 2000).
Crucially, visual marking is hypothesized to be a top-down atten-
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tional process and is therefore dependent on limited-capacity re-
sources. Such a top-down inhibitory mechanism may have several
advantages. First, it allows for efficient selection of new objects
whose properties are not yet known. For example, imagine we
walk in a forest and suddenly hear a noise. We anticipate that soon
an animal will jump out. However, this could be an animal of any
kind with any combination of very different shapes, sizes, colors,
and dynamic properties. It could be a black and white magpie, a
red fox, a brown rabbit, or a green snake. Instead of trying to bias
selection toward the unknown, selection may be optimized by
suppressing the properties of the objects currently present. A
second advantage of top-down inhibition is that, in combination
with other attentional sets (see above), it allows for more cognitive
control in selection. If the present stimuli are not relevant to us, we
may suppress them, but when they are, or become, relevant, their
suppression may be lifted or even turned into enhancement. Again,
this control can be more precise and more effective because it is
dealing with the information currently available.
In the present study we sought to test further the top-down
aspects of visual marking. One rather counterintuitive prediction
from the visual marking account is that if attention is not available,
visual information cannot be ignored. This is because without
attentional resources, no top-down inhibitory set can be created.
We tested this directly by presenting the old, irrelevant information
inside a so-called attentional blink (e.g., Raymond, Shapiro, &
Arnell, 1992; Shapiro & Raymond, 1994) and then measured to
what extent this old information interfered with a subsequently
presented target set.
Visual Marking
Using an adapted conjunction task, Watson and Humphreys
(1997) investigated the role of old distractors in visual search
displays. They gave participants a 1,000-ms preview of a set of
green H distractors before adding a second set to the display,
consisting of blue A distractors and, on present trials, a blue H
target. Once the second set was presented, the display conformed
to that used in standard form–color conjunction tasks. However, in
this preview condition, search was much more efficient than in the
standard conjunction baseline, in which both green and blue dis-
tractors appeared simultaneously. In fact, search slopes were no
higher than in a standard single-feature baseline, in which only the
second set (the blue items) was present. Apparently, participants
could use the preview period to ignore the old items and limit their
search to the new items only. Thus, although the physical appear-
ance of the distractors did not change, the fact that they appeared
at an earlier moment in time reduced their influence on selection
(see also Kahneman, Treisman, & Burkell, 1983). Subsequent
experiments have shown that, unlike in onset capture experiments
(Yantis & Jonides, 1984), the effect disappears when part of the
old items is offset, indicating that the preview effect is not just
caused by new onset capture. Furthermore, the preview benefit
does not appear to be due to inhibition of return. For instance, a
brief complete offset of the old items eliminates the preview effect
(Watson & Humphreys, 1997), whereas inhibition of return has
been shown to survive such transient visual changes (Klein, 1988;
Maylor & Hockey, 1985; Posner & Cohen, 1984; though see
Mu¨ller & von Mu¨hlenen, 2000, and Takeda & Yagi, 2000).
Instead, Watson and Humphreys (1997) proposed a mechanism
of visual marking to account for the findings. They suggested that
the preview period allows observers to mark the old items by
inhibiting them in parallel, and hence the new set is prioritized.
Figure 1 shows a tentative model of how this might work. When
the observer is facing some old and irrelevant visual information,
he or she may set up a goal state to ignore the old set in order to
anticipate the target set. This involves establishing an inhibitory
template (or inhibitory attentional set) specifying what visual
representation is to be suppressed. This visual representation may
take several forms. Watson and Humphreys (1997; see also Olivers
et al., 1999) proposed that the locations of to-be-ignored items are
represented in a location map (cf. Treisman & Gelade, 1980), as
illustrated in Figure 1. These locations are subsequently marked
for inhibition so that they will be avoided in the search process.
Marking locations can be quite effective, as it is precise and allows
for a heterogeneous scene to be inhibited without having to specify
all visual properties of that scene (e.g., Theeuwes, Kramer, &
Atchley, 1998). In addition, there is evidence that visual marking
can also be applied to other stimulus representations. For instance,
Watson and Humphreys (1998) and Olivers et al. (1999) found
evidence that with moving stimuli, inhibition is applied to a unique
Figure 1. Working model of visual marking. Adapted from “Visual
Marking: Prioritizing Selection for New Objects by Top-Down Attentional
Inhibition of Old Objects,” by D. G. Watson and G. W. Humphreys, 1997,
Psychological Review, 104, p. 117. Copyright 1997 by the American
Psychological Association.
23VISUAL MARKING AND THE ATTENTIONAL BLINK
feature of the old items, in this case color. So, for example, by
suppressing the feature map coding green, all green items can be
deprioritized, wherever they are in the visual field.
For the purposes of the present study it is important to note that
Watson and Humphreys (1997) conceived of visual marking as
being a top-down, goal-driven process that depends on limited-
capacity attentional resources. Support for this view comes from a
number of experiments. For instance, Watson and Humphreys
(2000) used a probe-detection task to measure the inhibition of old
distractors directly. On a majority of trials, participants carried out
a search task after viewing a preview of one set of distractors. On
a minority of trials, however, a tone indicated that participants had
to switch tasks and detect a probe dot instead. Although the probe
was equally likely to appear on a new or an old item, detection was
less accurate for the latter. It was also less accurate than detection
for the equivalent (green) items in a standard conjunction baseline,
in which all items appeared simultaneously. This is consistent with
the old items being inhibited. The most important finding, how-
ever, was that the reduced detection on old items was greatly
diminished when participants had to abandon the search task
completely and instead detect a probe on every trial. This provides
direct evidence that the inhibition can be modulated by the task
demands. Old items are less inhibited when the inhibition is
actually detrimental to the task (because a dot can appear on one
of them).1
A second example comes from an earlier experiment by Watson
and Humphreys (1997; Experiment 8). In this experiment, Watson
and Humphreys gave participants a secondary task during the
preview period, when only the green Hs were present. The task
was to shadow a series of four digits at fixation (presented for 250
ms each), followed by the search task. The result was that the
preview effect was attenuated, as search slopes increased relative
to the single-feature baseline (though there was still a secondary
task preceding the search displays in the baseline). Watson and
Humphreys (1997) concluded that visual marking required limited
attentional resources, in line with a top-down inhibitory account
(see also Humphreys, Watson, & Jolicoeur, in press).
Overview of the Present Experiments
In the present study we investigated in further detail the resource
limitations of visual marking. One of the most important and
somewhat counterintuitive predictions from the visual marking
account is that taking attention away from distractors will not help
in ignoring them. To ignore distractors effectively, an inhibitory
template needs to be set up, and this requires attentional resources.
To test this, we sought to apply a way of removing attention from
the old distractors that was somewhat different from Watson and
Humphreys’s dual-task experiment (Watson & Humphreys, 1997,
Experiment 8; described above). Instead of presenting a task
during the preview period, we looked for a task that could be
conducted beforehand but that would still exert its influence during
the preview period. An excellent candidate is the rapid serial visual
presentation (RSVP) task, as employed in the attentional blink
paradigm (e.g., Raymond et al., 1992). In a typical RSVP task, the
observer is presented with a stream of letters at fixation (usually
around 10 letters per second). In the dual-task condition, the
observer has to first identify a differently colored target letter (T1)
and then detect whether a second target letter (T2) is present in the
remainder of the stream. In the single-task condition, T1 is still
present but only T2 needs to be detected. The common finding is
that in the dual task, the detection of T2 is severely impaired if it
appears shortly after T1 (although the immediately following item
is often spared) and then gradually improves with time until it is
back to the single-task baseline about 400 to 500 ms after T1. It is
as if attention blinks for about half a second (Raymond et al., 1992;
Shapiro & Raymond, 1994).
In the current experiments, we used the RSVP task as a tool to
manipulate the amount of attention available for visual marking by
presenting the preview display more or less inside an attentional
blink period. We found that the closer in time the previewed
distractors were presented to T1, the less efficient subsequent
search became, suggesting that distractor inhibition requires atten-
tional resources.
Subsequently, we investigated how the attentional blink affects
visual marking. The model outlined in Figure 1 assumes there are
several processing stages to visual marking, such as the creation of
a location map and the setting up of an inhibitory template. These
were pitted against each other in Experiments 3 and 4. We found
no evidence for the disruption of spatial processing. Instead, our
results suggest that the attentional blink affects the top-down
inhibition of the old distractors.
The attentional blink procedure has certain advantages over
Watson and Humphreys’s (1997) dual-task experiment. First, it
allows for a gradual manipulation of the amount of attentional
resources available for visual marking by shifting the preview
display more or less into the blink period. We predicted that visual
marking would be most affected when the old distractors were
presented immediately after T1, with a gradual increase in perfor-
mance as stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) was increased. Sec-
ond, in contrast to Watson and Humphreys’s (1997) Experiment 8,
in our attentional blink procedure the secondary task was presented
before, instead of during, the preview display. This has the advan-
tage that there is no low-level visual interference from the second-
ary task during the actual preview period. In Watson and Hum-
phreys’s (1997) experiment, any attenuation of the preview effect
may have been caused by the stimulus itself rather than by the task
demands (though see Humphreys et al., in press).
Experiment 1: Establishing the Preview Effect
In Experiment 1 we sought to replicate Watson and Hum-
phreys’s (1997) basic preview effect. Because we changed some
1 As was pointed out by one of the reviewers, the evidence for inhibition
is not conclusive in this case because of the difficulty of establishing an
appropriate baseline. Here the baseline was a standard conjunction condi-
tion in which all items appeared simultaneously. However, it may have
been that in this baseline all items were relatively enhanced (because all
were new onsets). New evidence from our lab (Olivers & Humphreys,
2001b) points more directly toward suppression. We conducted experi-
ments in which a salient new feature singleton appeared in the second set.
Normally, such singletons can guide attention (Yantis & Egeth, 1999).
However, we found that this guidance was mitigated when the singleton
shared one or more of its features with the old, ignored distractors. This
suggests an inhibitory carryover from old to new items on the basis of
similarity. Similar effects were found in the present study (Experiment 4).
Moreover, in Experiment 3 we found probe dot detection effects that are
difficult to explain under a simple enhancement account.
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aspects of the task, a replication was desired to provide a baseline
for subsequent experiments, which evaluated performance under
dual-task conditions. Figure 2 shows a typical trial from the
preview (PV) condition in Experiment 1. We presented partici-
pants with a display of green H distractors, followed after 1,000 ms
by the addition of a set of blue A distractors and a blue H target.
As in Watson and Humphreys’s (1997) study, we compared this
PV condition to two baselines, namely, a standard single-feature
(SF) search for a blue H among blue As and a standard conjunction
(CJ) search for a blue H among simultaneously presented green Hs
and blue As. However, unlike in Watson and Humphreys’s (1997)
study, in our study the target was almost always present (save a
few catch trials), and the participant’s task was to localize it by
way of pointing and clicking with the mouse. This led to the
advantage of easier interpretation of the results, as absent trials in
simple detection tasks often tend to be subject to a variety of
search strategies (Corcoran & Jackson, 1979; Humphreys & Mu¨l-
ler, 1993; Wolfe et al., 1989). Furthermore, this procedure maxi-
mized the number of critical target-present trials for a given
participant. In the localization task, there is also less room for
speed–accuracy trade-offs because participants know the target is
(almost) always there.2
Method
Participants. Nineteen undergraduates (11 male and 8 female, all
right-handed) from the University of Birmingham participated in return for
course credits or money. The average age was 21.9 years (range  18–35
years). All participants had self-reported normal or corrected-to-normal
vision.
Apparatus and stimuli. The visual search displays were presented on a
15 (38.1-cm) monitor driven by a Pentium-200 PC with a VESA graphics
card running at 800  600  256 resolution. The stimuli were generated
by a purpose-written Turbo Pascal 7.0 program, which also recorded RTs
and responses. The viewing distance was approximately 75 cm. The visual
search displays were constructed by randomly plotting all search items on
an 8  8 grid, subtending approximately 8.3°  8.3° in visual angle. The
letters, A and H, were rectangular (as on a digital alarm clock) and were
0.6° high by 0.4° wide. The green and blue colors were very similar to the
colors in Watson and Humphreys’s (1997) original experiment and were
roughly isoluminant (as determined by a flicker test on the experimenter;
Ives, 1912). In the pointing display, all cells of the 8  8 grid were filled
with gray circular position markers with a radius of about 0.2°.
Design and procedure. Each trial started with the appearance of a
fixation cross, which stayed on during the remainder of the trial. After 750
ms, either a search display appeared (SF and CJ conditions) or a preview
display appeared first, followed after 1,000 ms by the search display (PV
condition). The search display stayed on until the participant responded,
with a maximum duration of 5s. In the SF condition, displays consisted of
a blue H target, together with 1, 3, or 7 blue A distractors, resulting in total
display sizes of 2, 4, and 8 items, respectively. In the CJ condition, for each
blue item, there was a green H, resulting in total display sizes of 4, 8, and
16 items, respectively.
The PV condition was the same as the CJ condition except that the green
Hs were presented first, with the blue items added only after 1,000 ms.
Participants were instructed to click the left mouse button as soon as they
detected the blue H target but to withhold their response if there was no
target present. The latter was the case on 6% of trials. These catch trials
were added to discourage participants from making anticipatory responses.
After the first click (which was timed), the search display was replaced
with a pointing display (see Figure 2), and participants had to move the
mouse pointer to the target position and click again. This second click and
the movements leading up to it were not timed. The main conditions were
run in separate blocks, with 16 trials for each Condition  Display Size
combination. Block order was completely counterbalanced across partici-
pants (apart from order CJ-PV-SF, which was run four times instead of
three). Trials that led to an incorrect response (i.e., wrong localizations,
responses to catch trials, RTs  100 ms, and RTs  5,000 ms) were
repeated by randomly intermingling them with the remainder of the trials.
Feedback was provided on every trial. Correct responses were followed by
a tick mark at the target location as well as a brief high-pitched tone.
Incorrect responses were followed by a cross mark and a longer, low-
pitched tone. After every 45 trials there was a short break during which
participants received feedback on their average RT and accuracy levels.
They were asked to maintain an accuracy level of at least 80%. A practice
block of 36 trials preceded each test block.
Results
The mean RT for each cell was calculated after incorrect trials,
catch trials, and outliers had been removed. Outliers were identi-
fied by a procedure recommended by Van Selst and Jolicoeur
(1994). This procedure involves the recursive elimination of RTs
beyond s standard deviations from the mean, with s varying
according to the number of data points in the cell (i.e., a modified
recursion with moving criterion). The procedure resulted in an
elimination of 3% of the data points. Mean RTs were then sub-
mitted to several analyses of variance (ANOVAs), which assessed
performance in the PV condition relative to the SF and CJ base-
lines, with display size as a factor. Similar analyses were per-
formed on the error data. Note that in all conditions (including the
SF condition), slopes were calculated for display sizes of 4, 8, and
16, although in the SF condition, the real display sizes were 2, 4,
and 8, respectively. This leads to an underestimation by 50% of the
real SF slope but therefore enables a direct comparison with the
PV condition, in which, if observers completely ignore the first set,
the use of display sizes 4, 8, and 16 will lead to the same
underestimation. The inferential statistics are not affected by this
procedure (see Watson & Humphreys, 1997, for further details).
RTs. Figure 3 shows the search RTs as a function of display
size for each condition. Search slopes measured 12 ms per item in
the SF condition, 28 ms per item in the CJ condition, and 15 ms per
item in the PV condition (measured across the total display sizes of
4, 8, and 16). Overall, responses were slowest in the CJ condition
and fastest in the SF condition, with RTs for the PV condition
falling in between, F(1.6, 28.9)  25.2, MSE  19,187, p  .01.3
Also, RTs generally increased with display size, F(1.1, 19.4) 
70.6, MSE 18,517, p .01, but more so in the CJ condition than
in the SF and PV conditions, resulting in a significant Condition
Display Size interaction, F(2.3, 41.3)  17.3, MSE  5,547, p 
.01. Separate ANOVAs revealed that the search slope in the PV
condition was significantly more shallow than that in the CJ
condition, F(1.3, 24.3) 15.6, MSE 5,973, p .01, and was no
different from that in the SF condition, F(1.4, 25.0) 2.6, p .10.
Errors. Table 1 shows the error percentages for each condition
and display size. An ANOVA revealed an effect of display size
2 The data presented in Experiment 1 formed part of a larger experiment
comprising several more conditions. Here we present only the conditions
relevant to the present study.
3 Where degrees of freedom are fractionated, a Greenhouse–Geisser
correction for sphericity violations was applied.
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only, F(1.5, 27.6)  4.9, MSE  5, p  .05, as errors increased
with the number of blue items. The overall correlation between
RTs and error percentages was .74. Close inspection of Table 1
suggests that, overall, more errors were made in the CJ and PV
conditions than in the SF condition, although this was not signif-
icant. More important, display size had no differential effect across
conditions, suggesting that accuracy was not sacrificed to maintain
search efficiency. The average false alarm rate on catch trials was
18.5%, with an approximately equal distribution across conditions
(SF: 18.5%; CJ: 22.2%; PV: 16.7%).
Discussion
The most important finding of Experiment 1 was the replication
of the preview effect. The results show that performance (in terms
of search slopes) in the PV condition (15 ms per item) was much
more efficient than performance in the CJ condition (28 ms per
item) and was almost as efficient as performance in the SF con-
dition (12 ms per item). This indicates that old distractors can be
effectively ignored and that search is limited to new items only.
The fact that we used a target localization task instead of a
present–absent detection task does not alter this conclusion. This
therefore provides a sound frame of reference for the subsequent
experiments we conducted in this study, all of which involved the
localization task. Moreover, it indicates that visual marking is a
robust phenomenon, emerging across a variety of tasks, and that it
can be of real relevance outside the laboratory, where targets need
to be localized as well as detected.
Experiment 2: The Attentional Blink
Affects Visual Marking
In Experiment 2 we investigated the resource limitations of
visual marking by introducing an RSVP task prior to the visual
search display. A typical sequence of events is illustrated in Figure
4. In all conditions, participants first viewed, at fixation, a stream
of rapidly changing letters, one of which was a target letter (T1, as
defined by a different color). The letter series was then immedi-
ately followed by the preview display (consisting of green Hs),
which was presented for 450 ms. In the single-task condition, the
letter stream had no relevance to the participant. In the dual-task
condition, however, participants had to identify T1, which was
presented at different intervals (SOAs) from the preview display.
As in Experiment 1, the preview display was followed by a search
display, and participants had to localize a blue H as quickly as
possible. Finally, they were asked to type in T1 (dual-task condi-
tion only).
Figure 2. A typical trial of the preview condition in Experiment 1. Participants ignored the green Hs (black)
in the preview display and pressed a mouse button when they spotted a blue H (gray) in the second display.
Reaction times were measured according to this first click. Participants then selected the target’s location with
the mouse pointer and clicked again. This last click was not timed.
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We predicted that T1 would cause an attentional blink, which,
when triggered moments before the preview display, takes atten-
tional resources away from visual marking. As old distractors will
then receive less inhibition, subsequent search through the new set
should suffer. In contrast, in the single-task baseline, inhibition
should remain relatively intact and SOA should have no effect. In
short, we predicted an SOA  Task interaction. This was tested in
Experiment 2c, which applied the attentional blink procedure to a
PV condition.
We chose to shorten the preview period from a typical 1,000 ms
to 450 ms to optimize any secondary task effects. Watson and
Humphreys (1997) investigated the time course of visual marking
and found that the preview effect reaches its optimum around
400–600 ms. The preview period of 450 ms in the present exper-
iment should thus have been sufficient to create at least a substan-
tial (if not complete) preview advantage. On the other hand,
attentional blink studies have shown that, at least for normal
observers (cf. Husain, Shapiro, Martin, & Kennard, 1997), the
attentional blink lasts between 400 and 500 ms (Duncan, Martens,
& Ward, 1997; Raymond et al., 1992; Shapiro & Raymond, 1994).
Therefore, for visual marking to be affected, the attentional blink
period should cover a substantial part of the preview period. For
instance, had we left the preview period at 1,000 ms, a 500-ms
blink would still have left a sufficient period of 500 ms for
marking to be implemented.
Notice that there is a confound in this procedure. Because the
preview period remained fixed at 450 ms, shifting the old distrac-
tors nearer to T1 meant that the new (to-be-searched) items came
equally near. Any effect of SOA may thus have been due to the
attentional blink carrying over to the search stage itself instead of
being restricted to the visual marking stage (assuming that the
attentional blink would extend beyond 450 ms). We therefore
conducted Experiments 2a and 2b, which served as control exper-
iments, to see whether the blink extended beyond the preview
period and had a systematic effect on the search stage. In these
experiments also, T1 was followed by green Hs but these had no
predictive value, as they either randomly changed position (the CJ
condition, Experiment 2b) or disappeared altogether (the SF con-
dition, Experiment 2a) when the new, blue items appeared. Be-
cause we predicted that the blink would affect only the preview
display, we expected there would be no SOA  Task interaction.
In addition, the SF and CJ conditions of Experiments 2a and 2b
served as useful baselines against which the magnitude of the
secondary task interference in Experiment 2c (PV condition) could
be estimated.
Method
Participants. Forty-eight (6 male and 42 female, including 2 left-
handed and 46 right-handed) undergraduates and postgraduates partici-
pated voluntarily, for course credits or for money. The average age was
19.7 years (range  18–26 years). Experiments 2a, 2b, and 2c each had 16
participants.
Apparatus and stimulus. The experimental setup was the same as in
Experiment 1. The visual search displays were also identical. The new part
of the study was the introduction of a rapidly presented series of letters
appearing prior to the search display. The series always began and ended
with an asterisk, which served as a fixation point as well as a mask for T1
(there is evidence that the attentional blink is abolished if T1 is not masked;
see Breitmeyer, Ehrenstein, Pritchard, Hiscock, & Crisan, 1999; Raymond
et al., 1992; Seiffert & Di Lollo, 1997). The letters were randomly drawn
from the alphabet (with the restriction that two consecutive letters could
not be identical) and presented in a light blue 24-point Helvetica font
(approximately 0.4°  0.4°). The target (T1) was yellow. This color
scheme was chosen because in a pilot study with the typically used black
distractors and a white T1, there appeared to be an attentional blink even
in the single-task condition, suggesting that a T1 that contrasts too much
with the distractors might automatically capture attention in our setup. The
letters were presented at a rate of 8.5 Hz, with each letter being presented
for 100 ms, followed by a 17-ms blank.
Design and procedure. The SF, CJ, and PV conditions were run
separately in Experiments 2a, 2b, and 2c, respectively, each with a new
group of participants. In all experiments and all conditions, trials started
with a blank screen lasting 750 ms, followed by a fixation asterisk for 500
ms, which was in turn followed by a series of letters. The length of the
series varied randomly between 14 and 20 letters, to prevent anticipation.
The series ended with another asterisk, masking the last character. Count-
ing from the end of the series, the target letter, T1, appeared at Positions 1,
2, 3, 5, and 8, with Position 1 being the last character before the asterisk.
These positions corresponded to SOAs of 117, 234, 351, 585, and 936 ms,
respectively. After the letter series, and simultaneously with the final
asterisk, a preview display consisting of green Hs appeared in all three
conditions. The preview period lasted 450 ms. In the SF condition (Ex-
periment 2a), the preview display simply disappeared and was replaced
with a search display consisting of only blue items, with the restriction that
none of the blue items could fall on an old location. In the CJ condition
(Experiment 2b), the preview display also disappeared when the search
items arrived but was immediately replaced with a new set of randomly
positioned green Hs, as well as the blue target set. Again, none of the new
items could fall on an old item’s location. In the PV condition (Experiment
Table 1
Error Percentages for Experiment 1
Condition
Display size (no. of items)
4 8 16
Single-feature search 2.0 2.2 4.0
Conjunction search 2.2 1.9 5.6
Preview 3.4 2.9 6.6
Figure 3. Search functions for Experiment 1. RT  reaction time; CJ 
conjunction; PV  preview; SF  single feature.
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2c), the preview display was a genuine preview display, as the green Hs
remained in their positions when the second display appeared.
The search task was the same as in Experiment 1 but with total display
sizes of 6 and 12 items, half of which were green and half of which were
blue. This time, 12% of the trials were catch trials, in which case partici-
pants were instructed not to respond. In the single-task condition, partici-
pants were asked to ignore the letter stream, while maintaining fixation,
and to concentrate on the search task. In the dual-task condition, partici-
pants were asked to extract T1 from the letter stream and remember it until
the end of the trial. After they had correctly localized the search target (blue
H), they were asked to type in the letter they saw (this was not timed). The
search task was stressed as the most important task, but participants were
encouraged to identify as many letters as they could and to guess if they
were not sure. If they made an error in the search task, they were not asked
to identify T1.
Each experimental session followed an ABAB design with single task
and dual task alternating between blocks. Block order was counterbalanced
between participants. Participants received feedback on the search task as
well as on the T1 identification task. After every 45 trials there was a short
break in which participants were presented with their overall RTs and
accuracy scores. Erroneous trials were repeated by being randomly inserted
in the remainder of the block. At the end of the experiment there were 15
correct trials for each combination of task, SOA, and display size. Because
it was a complex and difficult procedure, the experiment was preceded by
an extensive practice session. Participants first practiced T1 detection only.
After the letter task, participants practiced the search task only, followed by
a block of 24 trials in which the two tasks were combined. At this stage,
participants generally no longer had difficulties with the task, although we
replaced 5 of the 48 participants because they made errors on more than
30% of the trials in either of the tasks.
Results
The RT data were submitted to the same outlier elimination
procedure used in Experiment 1. This resulted in a loss of 2.8% of
the data points in Experiment 2a, 2.3% in Experiment 2b, and
2.4% in Experiment 2c. Remaining correct RTs (excluding trials
on which T1 was not identified correctly) as well as error percent-
ages were then submitted to within-subjects ANOVAs with task
(single, dual), SOA (117, 234, 351, 585, 936 ms), and display size
(6, 12) as factors. The descriptive RT data of Experiment 2 are
shown in Figures 5–8. Table 2 shows the error percentages for the
search tasks (collapsed across display sizes) as well as for the T1
detection task. We report the analyses for each condition sepa-
Figure 4. A typical trial from Experiment 2: The figure shows a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) task
combined with a preview display, as it would occur in the preview condition (Experiment 2c). The RSVP letters
were blue, except for the first target letter (T1), which was yellow. The stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) was
the time between the onset of T1 and the onset of the preview display. The search task was the same as in
Experiment 1. In the dual-task condition, search was followed by a T1 response display.
28 OLIVERS AND HUMPHREYS
rately before we move on to the between-subjects analyses across
the search conditions of Experiments 2a through 2c.
The catch trials resulted in 14.5% false alarms. This is lower
than in Experiment 1, probably because of the higher proportion of
catch trials present (11.7% vs. 6.3%). Overall, false alarms were
evenly distributed across task, display size, and condition, al-
though more errors were made in the SF condition (17.2%) than in
the CJ and PV conditions (12.2% and 13.9%, respectively).
Results: Experiment 2a (SF Condition)
RTs. Search RTs are shown in Figure 5. The only significant
main effect was of display size, F(1, 15)  83.6, MSE  5,821,
p .01. It took longer to search 12 items than to search 6, resulting
in an average slope of 13 ms per item (collapsed across SOA and
task). This slope is almost identical to the SF slope found in
Experiment 1 (12 ms per item). Task and SOA had no effect (Fs
1). Most important, there was no Task  SOA interaction, F 
1.2, nor was the Task  SOA  Display Size interaction signif-
icant, F  1.76. As can be seen from Figure 5, RTs remained
reasonably stable across SOAs in the single- as well as the dual-
task conditions. Although the ANOVA results gave us no reason to
do so, we performed separate t tests on the single- versus dual-task
conditions for each SOA and display size (Fisher’s least significant
difference [LSD]) as well as t tests between the last SOA (936 ms)
and each of the other SOAs in the dual task. We did this to match
the analyses with those in Experiment 2c, in which such analyses
were warranted by the ANOVA. The individual t test, being more
powerful, may detect a residual task effect. However, none of the
t values was significant.
Errors. A similar ANOVA revealed no significant main effect
of error percentages and no interactions. Error levels remained
virtually identical across SOAs and display size. Again, we per-
formed separate t tests for each SOA so that statistical power
would be matched across Experiments 2a through 2c. Table 2
suggests a trend for more errors in the dual-task condition at the
shortest SOA (117 ms), and for Display Size 6 this proved to be
significant, t(15)  2.2, p  .05.
Results: Experiment 2b (CJ Condition)
RTs. Search RTs, as a function of task, SOA, and display size,
are shown in Figure 6. Again, the only significant factor was a
main effect of display size, F(1, 15)  131.7, MSE  19,235, p 
.01. RTs were slower for Display Size 12 than for Display Size 6,
and the average search slope (collapsed across SOAs and task)
Figure 6. Mean correct reaction times (RTs) for Experiment 2b (conjunction condition) for (a) Display Size
6 and (b) Display Size 12. Error bars represent one standard error. T1 first target letter; SOA stimulus onset
asynchrony.
Figure 5. Mean correct reaction times (RTs) for Experiment 2a (single-feature condition) for (a) Display Size
6 and (b) Display Size 12. Error bars represent one standard error. T1 first target letter; SOA stimulus onset
asynchrony.
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measured 30 ms per item. This is comparable to the CJ slope of
Experiment 1 (28 ms per item). Search times remained unaffected
by task or SOA, as was further confirmed by individual t tests.
Errors. The ANOVA on error percentages revealed no main
effects or interactions, and also Table 2 suggests that error per-
centages remained reasonably constant. However, a t test indicated
a significant difference in errors between the shortest and longest
SOAs in the dual-task condition (117 vs. 936 ms) on Display Size
6, with more errors being made on the shortest SOA. This result is
similar to that obtained in Experiment 2a, although there the effect
was significant only relative to the single-task baseline condition.
Results: Experiment 2c (PV Condition)
RTs. As can be seen in Figure 7, the pattern of performance in
Experiment 2c was quite different from Experiments 2a and 2b. As
before, RTs were slower overall in the dual-task condition, F(1,
15)  6.9, MSE  20,703, p  .05, and increased with display
size, F(1, 15) 250.8, MSE 5,453, p .01. The average search
slope was 22 ms per item. An interesting finding was that RTs
increased at shorter SOAs, F(3.4, 50.5)  4.6, MSE  3,923, p 
.01. Figure 7 indicates that this was confined to the dual-task
condition only, resulting in a significant Task  SOA interaction,
F(3.3, 49.7)  9.6, MSE  3,046, p  .01.
We performed individual t tests (Fisher’s LSD) comparing the
dual- with the single-task condition for each SOA and display size
to explore the dual-task interference across time. At Display Size
6, the dual-task condition led to significantly increased RTs for
SOAs of 117, 234, and 351 ms: t(15)  3.1, p  .01; t(15)  2.9;
p  .05; t(15)  2.2, p  .05, respectively. At the longest two
SOAs, 585 and 936 ms, there were no reliable differences between
tasks ( ps .23). At Display Size 12, the dual-task condition led to
significantly increased RTs for SOAs of 117 and 234 ms, t(15) 
Figure 7. Mean reaction times (RTs) for Experiment 2c (preview condition) for (a) Display Size 6 and (b)
Display Size 12. Error bars represent one standard error. T1  first target letter; SOA  stimulus onset
asynchrony.
Figure 8. Combined results of all dual-task conditions of Experiment 2. (a) Reaction times (RTs) for Display
Size 6, (b) RTs for Display Size 12, and (c) search slopes across display sizes. Error bars represent one standard
error. SOA  stimulus onset asynchrony; SF  single feature; CJ  conjunction; PV  preview.
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4.4, p  .001, and t(15)  2.47, p  .05, respectively, but not for
SOAs of 351, 585, and 936 ms ( ps  .17). As can be seen from
Figure 7, the RT differences between the dual and single task
became gradually smaller with increasing SOA.
Because dual-task performance never reached the same level as
single-task performance (except on Display Size 12, SOA 936 ms;
see also Experiments 2a and 2b), the single task may not be the
most appropriate baseline against which to compare the effects of
SOA. We therefore also performed t tests within the dual task only,
comparing the first four SOAs (117, 234, 351, 585 ms) to the last
SOA (936 ms). This led to roughly the same picture, with signif-
icant differences for the shortest two SOAs (117 and 234 ms) on
both display sizes, Display Size 6: t(15)  3.2, p  .01, and
t(15)  3.5, p  .01, for SOAs of 117 and 234 ms, respectively;
Display Size 12: t(15)  4.4, p  .01, and t(15)  2.8, p  .05,
for SOAs of 117 and 234 ms, respectively. However, there were no
differences for the longest three SOAs (351, 585, and 936 ms), all
ps  .2.
Errors. The ANOVA revealed no error effects, and the t tests
indicated a significant drop in errors in only the single-task con-
dition on the longest SOA (936 ms), t(15)  3.1, p  .01.
Experiments 2a, 2b, and 2c Combined: Between-Subjects
Analysis Comparing SF, CJ, and PV Conditions
We combined the search data of the dual-task conditions of
Experiments 2a, 2b, and 2c into an ANOVA with search condition
(SF, CJ, PV) as a between-subjects factor. Figures 8a and 8b show
the RTs for all dual-task conditions combined in one graph. Fur-
thermore, in Figure 8c we plotted the search slopes for each
condition and SOA. Overall, search performance was worst in the
CJ condition and best in the SF condition, with the PV condition
falling in between, F(2, 45) 5.1, MSE 166,639, p .01. What
is immediately striking in all plots is the S shape: With increasing
SOA, performance in the PV condition changes from a level close
to that of the CJ condition to a level close to that of the SF
condition. This was confirmed by a reliable Condition  SOA
interaction, F(7.0, 157.6)  5.7, MSE  3,720, p  .01. Although
Figure 8c suggests a similar interaction in terms of search slopes,
the Condition  Display Size  SOA effect was not reliable,
F(6.9, 155.4)  0.9, ns. Slope values tend to be more sensitive to
RT fluctuations as they are calculated by using two RTs—one
from Display Size 6, and one from Display Size 12. For instance,
a small RT increase on Display Size 12 accompanied by an equally
small RT decrease on Display Size 6 results in a double increment
in slope. However, the fact that the slope pattern goes in the same
direction as the absolute RT data is encouraging.
Discussion
In Experiment 2 we investigated whether visual marking is
affected by the attentional blink. To do this, we first had to make
sure that the attentional blink would affect only the first stage of
the visual search displays. This was done in Experiments 2a and
2b. The secondary task had no significant effect on RTs, and most
important, there was no effect of SOA. This suggests that the blink
was over before participants started searching the second set of
items. Nevertheless, a few remarks are in order. First, although the
effect of task was nonsignificant in both the SF and the CJ
conditions, there was a small overall trend toward slower RTs in
the dual-task condition, suggesting that task load did have a
general effect on search, at least on some trials. Possibly, having to
remember T1 takes up attentional or mnemonic resources required
for visual search. Alternatively, participants may, on some trials,
still be deciding which letter they saw and hence may be less
concentrated on the search task. The important point is that this
was a general effect present across conditions and not modulated
by SOA.
Second, participants tended to make slightly more errors on the
shortest SOAs in the dual-task conditions of the SF and CJ con-
ditions. This suggests that there may, on some trials, have been a
direct influence carried over from the T1 detection task on the
search task. This may have been caused by an extended blink
period. Alternatively, at shorter SOAs participants may be more
likely to still be deciding which letter they saw. In any case, these
effects were minor and contrasted clearly with the PV condition of
Experiment 2c, to which we turn next.
Search performance in the dual-task condition of Experiment
2c—the PV condition—was clearly affected by SOA. RT costs
relative to the single-task condition dropped from as much as 114
ms at the shortest SOA to around 20 ms at long SOAs. The same
pattern was found for search efficiency, with slopes dropping from
around 26 ms per item to 17 ms per item. Note again that, as in
Experiments 2a and 2b, dual-task performance never actually
reached the level of the single-task condition, probably because of
the reasons mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, inspection of Figure 7
suggests that the dual-task interference became negligible around
on SOA of 351 ms, a finding that was further supported by the
individual t tests. This is very close to the time course typically
associated with the attentional blink. Thus, we conclude that T1
created an attentional blink, which affected subsequent processing.
Because the only difference between the PV condition and the SF
and CJ conditions, in which we found no blink effect, was that
participants were given a useful preview of the distractors in the
PV condition, we must conclude that the attentional blink affected
the preview stage. This is consistent with the idea that visual
marking requires attentional resources. The inhibition of irrelevant
visual information is a limited-capacity process, and draining this
Table 2
Error Percentages for Experiment 2
Task SOA (ms)
Error percentages
Expt 2a: SF Expt 2b: CJ Expt 2c: PV
T1 detection 14.0 10.6 10.2
Single task 117 3.1 3.0 4.4
234 4.0 3.8 4.3
351 3.7 4.4 2.2
585 4.2 3.7 4.2
936 3.7 4.6 2.1
Dual task 117 4.8 4.8 4.1
234 3.1 3.0 3.7
351 4.2 3.7 3.6
585 3.8 3.9 2.8
936 4.8 2.7 4.4
Note. SOA  stimulus onset asynchrony; Expt  experiment; SF 
single-feature search; CJ  conjunction search; PV  preview; T1  first
target letter.
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capacity with a secondary task makes it difficult to subsequently
ignore distractors. When resources gradually become available,
marking becomes more efficient.
As can be seen in Figure 8c, although visual marking did
become more efficient with longer SOAs, the search slopes never
reached the level of the SF condition (even though both were
dual-task conditions). An exception is the longest SOA (936 ms),
but this seems more attributable to the fact that the SF slope
inexplicably went up instead of the PV slope coming down.
Averaged across the three longest SOAs, slopes measured 29 ms
per item in the CJ condition and 14 ms per item in the SF
condition. These values are again very much comparable to the
equivalent conditions of Experiment 1 (28 ms per item and 12 ms
per item, respectively), suggesting that overall search efficiency
was not hindered by the presence of a secondary task. In the PV
condition, however, slopes hovered around 19 ms per item at the
last three SOAs. This suggests that even after the blink period,
participants could not completely limit their search to the blue
items and that visual marking was therefore not fully implemented.
One reason could be that the mental load of T1 affects the effi-
ciency of visual marking. However, in the single-task condition of
Experiment 2c (without T1 load), search slopes were no better
(even slightly worse: M  22 ms per item), suggesting that mental
load was not the major cause. Instead, we believe that visual
marking may have been suboptimal because the preview period
(450 ms) was too short. Although Watson and Humphreys (1997)
concluded that visual marking can be implemented within about
400 ms, the present task and stimulus conditions may require a
somewhat longer preview period.
In Experiments 3a and 3b we explored and exploited the rela-
tionship between visual marking and the attentional blink further.
By asking where in the visual process the attentional blink affects
visual marking, we can learn about the mechanisms involved in
both phenomena.
Experiment 3: The Attentional Blink Affects the
Inhibitory Stage
In Experiments 3a and 3b we focused on the question of how the
attentional blink disrupts visual marking. Incidentally, the results
of these two experiments may also be useful for understanding the
attentional blink phenomenon itself (see the General Discussion
section). To guide the experiments, we required a working model
of visual marking. We began with the model outlined in the
introduction (see Figure 1). The model consists of roughly two
stages. The first stage involves building up a representation of the
attributes of to-be-marked distractors, such as their orientation,
color, and locations. For instance, with motion displays (e.g.,
where all items move at constant speed down the screen), there is
evidence that visual marking is applied to color maps, and this
inhibition spreads to new items sharing the same color (Olivers et
al., 1999; Watson & Humphreys, 1998). In contrast, other work
has indicated that with static displays like the present ones, loca-
tions may play a special role in visual marking. For instance, static
stimuli can be inhibited regardless of their color, orientation, or
identity, and the inhibition does not spread to new items sharing
the same features (Olivers et al., 1999; Theeuwes et al., 1998;
Watson & Humphreys, 1997; see also Watson, 2001, for evidence
that spatial layout is crucial even in motion stimuli). We hypoth-
esized therefore, that a crucial stage within the visual marking
model may be the construction of a location map (cf. Treisman &
Gelade, 1980) to which the inhibition can subsequently be applied.
We therefore call this first stage the spatial encoding stage.
The second stage is the inhibitory process itself. An inhibitory
template is set up, which suppresses the locations represented in
the location map. Any items at inhibited locations will suffer from
a disadvantage in the competition for visual selection. We propose
that the inhibitory template is maintained by the observer’s goal
state and is therefore subject to task constraints and limited atten-
tional resources. We term this the inhibitory stage. Both the spatial
encoding stage and the inhibitory stage may be affected by the
attentional blink.
The literature provides little guidance on the role of the atten-
tional blink on spatial coding. Some studies have manipulated the
spatial locations of the items in an RSVP stream and demonstrated
that the attentional blink extends across space. For instance, Vis-
ser, Zuvic, Bischof, and Di Lollo (1999) found that the identifi-
cation of T2 was impaired even though it was presented one degree
to the left or right of T1. They argued that attention cannot be
switched to a new location while the system is processing T1. A
similar result was obtained by Duncan et al. (1997). They pre-
sented participants with four RSVP streams arranged in a diamond
so that two streams were arranged to the left and the right of
fixation (horizontal streams) and the other two streams were above
and below fixation (vertical streams). In one condition, partici-
pants had to detect T1 from the horizontal streams and then switch
to the vertical streams to detect T2. Like Visser et al., Duncan et
al. found that T2 detection was impaired at shorter SOAs. Finally,
Joseph, Chun, and Nakayama (1997) showed that a T1 detection
task at fixation subsequently interferes with visual search for an
orientation-defined target in more eccentric locations, again show-
ing that the attentional blink spreads beyond the location of T1.
However, in all these studies, the to-be-detected T2 stimulus
property (e.g., identity or orientation) was essentially nonspatial
and thus did not provide a direct test for the role of the attentional
blink in spatial coding.
A second way in which the attentional blink could disrupt visual
marking is by affecting the inhibitory stage. According to this
inhibitory account, the attentional blink leaves the spatial repre-
sentation of the old distractors intact but affects the amount of
resources available for suppressing them. In other words, the
spatial representation stays active and cannot be ignored. To our
knowledge, no study has investigated the effect of the attentional
blink on inhibitory processes yet.
Finally, the attentional blink may affect both stages of our visual
marking model. The fact that attentional blink effects are measured
with such a widespread range of tasks (absence–presence detec-
tion, identification, visual search; e.g., Joseph et al., 1997; Ray-
mond et al., 1992) and an equally widespread range of stimulus
properties (letters, digits, basic shapes, color, orientation, motion,
pictures of objects; e.g., Joseph et al., 1997; Krope, Husain, &
Treue, 1998; Ross & Jolicoeur, 1999; Shapiro, Arnell, & Drake,
1991) suggests that it disrupts many different processes in the
visual system. Of course, and quite likely, the omnipresent disrup-
tion may have a central origin. For example, the locus of the
attentional blink may lie in the pool of limited-attentional-capacity
resources (cf. Chun & Potter, 1995). Any process affecting the
central capacity also affects all other processes relying on that
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capacity (Lee, Koch, & Braun, 1999). Within our model of visual
marking, for instance, a reduction of attentional capacity may
reduce the amount of visual short-term memory (VSTM) available
for distractor locations, as well as reduce the actual inhibition of
those locations. In turn, both reductions may stem from the failure
to set up an appropriate task–goal state in the first place, as the
observer is still too involved in complying with the goals of the T1
detection task.
The basic procedure of Experiment 3 is shown in Figure 9. In
Experiment 3a, we used an RSVP task (T1 identification) followed
by a PV condition in which the task was to localize a blue H.
However, we added a third task, which replaced the search task on
20% of the trials. This third task was signaled by a short beep and
involved the localization of a small probe dot appearing together
with the new set of items. The probe could appear either on an old
item or on a new item, and participants had to press the mouse
button and point to its location in the same manner as they would
click and point to the blue H target in the majority of trials. This
technique is highly similar to that used by Watson and Humphreys
(Watson and Humphreys, 2000; see also Klein, 1988, and the
introduction to the present article), with the important difference
being that here participants had to localize the probe dot explicitly
(instead of just detecting it). Also, here we used RT as the most
important measure, whereas Watson and Humphreys (2000) fo-
cused on response accuracy. Watson and Humphreys showed two
important results with this procedure: First, probe detection was
less accurate on green items than on blue items in both the PV
condition and the CJ baseline (again, in the PV condition, the
green items were presented first, and were thus old). However, the
difference was much bigger in the PV condition than in the CJ
condition, with probe detection being especially impaired on old,
green items. This strongly suggests that the old items were inhib-
ited, consistent with visual marking. The second important finding
was that the inhibition appeared to be task dependent. When
observers were asked to abandon the search for the blue H target
and to detect a probe dot on every trial, there was no difference in
accuracy levels between the PV and CJ conditions. Apparently,
observers inhibit old information only when it helps to perform the
task, leading to the conclusion that visual marking is a top-down,
goal-driven mechanism. To test this idea further, we conducted
Experiment 3b, in which, just as in the Watson and Humphreys
(2000) study, the dot appeared on every trial, again either on an old
or a new item. On these trials, participants did not have to look for
a blue H target, and thus we predicted there would be no inhibition
Figure 9. Part of the procedure in Experiment 3. In Experiment 3a, on most trials the search procedure was
similar to Experiments 1 and 2 (left path). On a minority of trials, however, participants heard a beep just before
the search display appeared, signaling that they had to localize a dot instead (right path). After the localization
task, participants had to type in the first target letter (T1). In Experiment 3b, observers never had to detect a letter
target and always looked for the dot instead (right path). Note that the displays were circular.
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of old distractors. Experiment 3b also served as a control experi-
ment to see whether any probe detection effects were due to
differences in timing in the blink and nonblink conditions or due to
low-level stimulus effects (e.g., lateral masking, when probes
appeared on old vs. new items).
The probe detection paradigm led us to the following predic-
tions:
1. Under successful marking, probe dot detection should be
generally slower on old, green items than on new, blue items
because the old items are being inhibited (Experiment 3a). There
should be no such difference, or at least a smaller one, when
observers look for a dot on every trial because dots are just as
likely to appear on old as on new items (Experiment 3b).
2. As in Experiment 2c, the further away in time the preview
display is presented from T1 (i.e., the longer the SOA), the more
efficient should search through the new, blue items become, sim-
ply because the old, green Hs are better inhibited (Experiment 3a).
3. Detection of a probe dot on a new, blue item should also
improve with SOA in Experiment 3a. If blue items are given
priority under visual marking conditions, then probe dots on blue
items should receive similar priority. No such improvement would
be expected in Experiment 3b: Dot detection should be unaffected
by SOA, as the dot is presented outside the attentional blink, and
no priority should be given to either old or new items.
The probe dot detection paradigm also allows us to directly pit
the spatial encoding account against the inhibitory account of how
the attentional blink disrupts visual marking, as becomes clear
from the following predictions:
4. According to the spatial encoding account, the closer in time
we move the old distractors to T1 (i.e., the shorter the SOA), the
worse the detection of probes on old, green Hs should become, as
the blink directly affects the spatial coding of the distractor and
hence the localization of the dot (Experiment 3a).
5. In contrast, and perhaps rather counterintuitively, according
to the inhibitory account, the closer in time we move the old
distractors to T1, the better should subsequent probes be localized
because a stronger attentional blink means that their locations are
less strongly inhibited (Experiment 3a). Again, no such differential
effects of SOA on probe detection were expected in Experiment
3b, in which old items should not be marked.
Predictions from a combination of the two accounts are harder
to make, as any result depends on the relative strengths of both
components. Therefore, depending on the direction of the out-
come, we could conclude only that one component was present,
not that the other component was absent.
As we expected the differences in dot detection to be relatively
minor, we wanted to eliminate other sources of variance as much
as possible, such as eccentricity effects and lateral masking. All
search items were therefore placed at regular spacing on the
perimeter of a virtual circle around fixation so that each item was
placed at an equal distance from fixation (see Figure 9).
A final change was made to the overall design of the experi-
ment. Because performance in the dual-task condition of Experi-
ment 2 did not reach that of the single-task baseline, we decided to
drop the single-task baseline altogether in Experiment 3. Instead,
the effect of the attentional blink at short SOA (117 ms, inside
blink) was measured against performance at the longest SOA (936
ms, outside blink) because Experiment 2 clearly indicated that
visual search efficiency had stabilized by then. All other SOAs
used in Experiment 2 were left out. Also, only one display size was
used (Display Size 12).
Method
Participants. Thirty university students (13 male and 17 female, in-
cluding 3 left-handed and 27 right-handed) participated for course credits
or money. The average age was 22.9 years (range 18–35 years). Twenty
participants took part in Experiment 3a, and 10 took part in Experiment 3b.
Stimulus and apparatus. The experimental setup was largely the same
as in previous experiments, with the difference that the search items were
now placed on the perimeter of a virtual circle around fixation. The radius
of this circle was 3.1°. Starting from a random position, six old items were
positioned first around the circle, with regular spacing between them. The
six new items then filled the spaces between the old items. On dot detection
trials, a small, gray, circular disk (radius  0.03°) appeared in the center
of the bottom half of one of the search items. The green and blue letters
were again roughly equiluminant, as determined by a flicker test on the
experimenter.
Design and procedure. The sequence of displays was largely the same
as in Experiment 2. However, there was no single-task baseline (see
above), and there were only two SOAs, 117 ms and 936 ms, which we refer
to as inside blink and outside blink, respectively. Only Display Size 12 (six
old and six new items) was used. In Experiment 3a, on 20% of the trials,
the visual search task was replaced by a dot detection task. Participants
were signaled to change task by a 20-ms 1000-Hz beep presented 20 ms
before the search display appeared. All search items remained visible, but
a small dot appeared on one of them. The dot was equally likely to appear
on a green item as on a blue item but never appeared on the blue H target.
Participants had to click as soon as they spotted it and then, with the mouse,
indicate where it was (by then, the whole display was replaced with
position markers). As in the previous experiment, participants subsequently
typed in what they thought was T1. Trial types were randomly mixed and
presented in four blocks of 100 trials each (of which 20 trials were dot
detection trials). Between blocks there was a break during which partici-
pants received feedback on their performance. Catch trials were not con-
sidered necessary in this experiment because on 20% of the trials (namely,
the dot detection trials), the target should not be responded to anyway.
Participants first received substantial practice by using the same step-by-
step procedure as in Experiment 2. Because of the difficulty of the task, the
first of the four blocks was also treated as practice. This left us with 120
trials for the blue H search task and 30 trials for the dot localization task
(15 on old items and 15 on new items) for each SOA (inside blink, outside
blink). It deserves mentioning, though, that the general pattern of results
also held with the first block included. The design and procedure of
Experiment 3b contained a few crucial differences. First, the dot appeared
on every single trial, making dot detection the only task. Second, half the
displays consisted of old, green Hs followed by new, blue As (green–blue
condition), whereas the other half consisted of old, blue As followed by
new, green Hs (blue–green condition). Experiment 3b thus served a num-
ber of purposes. First, it allowed for a direct replication of Watson and
Humphreys’s (2000) finding that inhibition was subject to top-down con-
trol. If a dot needs to be detected on every trial and it is equally likely to
appear on an old as on a new item, then no marking should occur.
Furthermore, any differences between dot detection for old and new items
in Experiment 3a may have occurred because of low-level masking rather
than top-down inhibition (e.g., old, green Hs may interfere more than new,
blue As). If masking is indeed responsible, then similar differences should
emerge in the green–blue condition of Experiment 3b, whereas the reverse
should occur in the blue–green condition. Finally, Experiment 3b con-
trolled for the differences in timing between T1 and the appearance of the
dot. Any differential effect of SOA could in principle be due to a direct
effect of the attentional blink on probe detection rather than to adverse
inhibitory effects of old items. If so, performance in Experiment 3b should
be very similar to that in Experiment 3a.
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Results: Experiment 3a
Mean RTs and error rates for all conditions are shown in Figure
10a.
RTs. The recursive clipping procedure removed 3.5% of the
RT data points. An overall ANOVA with trial type (blue H
detection, dot detection on old item, dot detection on new item)
and SOA (inside blink, outside blink) as factors revealed a main
effect of trial type, F(2, 38)  22.1, MSE  20,646, p .01, with
RTs being fastest for blue H targets and slowest for probe dot
targets presented on old, green items. The overall effect of SOA
was not significant (F 1). However, there was a significant Trial
Type  SOA interaction, F(1.7, 31.3)  6.5, MSE  6,142, p 
.01. When searching for a blue H target, participants were faster
with the longer SOA (outside the blink) than with the shorter SOA
(inside the blink; 671 vs. 618 ms), t(19) 2.1, p .05. In contrast,
when searching for a probe dot on an old item, participants were
slower with the longer SOA (806 vs. 877 ms), t(19) 2.5, p.05.
SOA had no reliable effect on search for a dot on a new, blue item
(677 vs. 670 ms), t(19)  1.0, ns. This trial Type  SOA
interaction also held for dot detection trials only, F(1, 19)  8.3,
MSE  3,672, p  .01, confirming the opposite effects of the
attentional blink on subsequent detection of dots on old versus new
items.
Errors. As can be seen from Figure 10, error rates in the
search and dot localization tasks followed the RTs (r2  0.72). An
ANOVA revealed only a main effect of trial type, however, F(1.7,
31.3)  6.8, MSE  12, p .01, with significantly more errors
being made with dots on old items than with dots on new items or
blue H targets. The T1 miss rate was 7.5%.
Results: Experiment 3b
The recursive clipping procedure removed 0.9% of the RT data
points. The remainder were entered in an ANOVA with display
order (green–blue, blue–green), trial type (dot detection on old
item vs. new item), and SOA (inside blink, outside blink) as
factors. There were no effects involving the order of displays (all
ps  .39), and Figure 10b therefore presents the data collapsed
across colors. None of the other effects were significant, either (all
ps .40). Mean RTs were 746 ms (old, inside blink), 758 ms (old,
outside blink), 768 ms (new, inside blink), and 765 ms (new,
outside blink). Similarly, none of the error effects was significant
(all ps  .19).
Discussion
How do the results match up with our working model of visual
marking and the possible roles the attentional blink could play in
it? Our first prediction was that the detection of dots on old,
marked items should be slower than dot detection on new, un-
marked items. This was clearly the case in Experiment 3a, as dot
detection for old items was about 200 ms slower and less accurate
than dot detection for new items. This stands in marked contrast to
Experiment 3b, in which there was no difference in dot localization
for old and new items (if anything, there was a small effect in the
opposite direction). An ANOVA on the dot trials only, with
experiment as a between-subjects factor, confirmed this, as it
revealed significant Experiment  Trial Type interactions for the
RTs as well as the error rates, F(1, 28) 23.9, MSE 10,916, p
.01, and F(1, 28) 7.1, MSE 84, p .05, respectively; all other
effects ns. As can be seen in Figure 10, overall dot detection RTs
in Experiment 3b (around 750 ms) lay in between those for
Experiment 3a (roughly 650 and 850 ms). In other words, the
prioritization of the new items in Experiment 3a led to an overall
dot detection improvement for new items, but this was paired with
a cost for old items, indicating that such prioritization is achieved
through a combination of inhibition (of old) and enhancement (of
new) items.
Experiment 3b also shows that the differences in dot detection
for old versus new items in Experiment 3a was not due to low-
level stimulus differences (e.g., in color and onset). Furthermore,
the absence of an SOA effect in Experiment 3b eliminates the
possibility that the different intervals associated with the atten-
tional blink were affecting probe detection directly. The present
RT experiment therefore replicates Watson and Humphreys’s
(2000) earlier findings and offers further support for the idea that
inhibition of old items is subject to top-down control. No inhibition
is applied to old items when inhibition is actually harmful to the
task at hand, for instance, when a dot must regularly be detected on
them.
Figure 10. Reactions times (RTs) and error percentages for (a) Experi-
ment 3a and (b) Experiment 3b. Columns represent the errors, and lines
represent the RTs. Error bars represent one standard error. Dot on Old 
dot appeared on old item; Dot on New  dot appeared on new item;
Search  results for the search task (blue H target). SOA  stimulus onset
asynchrony.
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Our second prediction, that if more resources become available
with longer SOAs, then visual marking should improve and so
should subsequent search, was also supported. Indeed, we found
that, as in Experiment 2c, search for the blue H became faster and
more accurate when the old distractors had been presented outside
the attentional blink period. This again suggests that the old
distractors are more efficiently discarded when attentional re-
sources are fully available, consistent with a visual marking ac-
count. Note, though, that in the present experiment the RT differ-
ence between the longest and shortest SOA was only 53 ms, which
was considerably less than the 114 ms we found in Experiment 2c.
Possibly, and quite likely, this may have been caused by the
differences in display layout. The use of regular displays appears
to have sped up search in general (compare the present RTs to
Display Size 12 of Experiment 2c), leaving less room for preview
benefits. Alternatively, after just having completed a dot detection
trial, observers may tend to not mark the old items on the next trial.
In any case, the difference between the two SOA conditions was
expected to be reduced. However, the fact that there was a differ-
ence is clearly consistent with the theory of a resource-demanding
inhibitory mechanism.
Our third prediction was that the pattern of performance for dots
on new, blue items should follow that of the blue H target,
following the rationale that if blue items gain priority in selection,
so should dots in the same location. This was not the case. Figure
10a shows there was only a minute decrease (7 ms) in the dot
detection condition. Although somewhat puzzling, this result cor-
responds to earlier findings by Watson and Humphreys (2000), and
we therefore believe it is real. Watson and Humphreys (2000),
using percentage correct as a measure, found that the accuracy
difference for probes on green versus blue items was greater in the
preview condition than in the conjunction baseline. However, and
important for the present results, the effect was almost entirely
accounted for by a drop in accuracy on green items in the preview
condition. In other words, probe detection for blue items was as
good in the conjunction condition as it was in the preview condi-
tion, and so here too visual marking had no effect. One possible
explanation is that blue (new) items already receive maximum
enhancement in all conditions and that further prioritization can
only be achieved through inhibition of old items. This would be
consistent with a visual marking account.
Fourth, we predicted that if the attentional blink affects the
spatial encoding of the old distractors, then a subsequent probe dot
presented on one of these distractors should be more difficult to
localize, as the visual system does not know where the item is.
When resources become available again, localization should im-
prove with SOA. However, we found the opposite: Probe dot
detection was better when the distractors had been presented inside
the blink period and became worse with longer SOA. This goes
against the spatial encoding account being the sole explanation of
the decreased efficiency of visual marking under attentional blink
conditions, although it does not rule it out. An important assump-
tion underlying our predictions was that the probe dot is somehow
tied to the representation of the old items (i.e., when an old item
becomes suppressed, a dot appearing on it becomes suppressed
too). Although the data support this assumption, such coupling
need not be on a spatial basis. In other words, old items may be
poorly spatially represented, but this does not necessarily extend to
the probe dot.4
Instead, the results are more in line with our fifth and final
prediction: According to the inhibitory account, probe detection
should actually improve with shorter SOA, as the inhibition will
deteriorate. Both RTs and errors followed exactly this pattern,
suggesting that the visual system does become less effective in
inhibiting distractors when hindered by an attentional blink.
Obviously, the results could also stem from a combination of the
two effects, in which the modulation of the inhibitory stage is just
the stronger of the two. The fact that the displays in Experiment 3
were highly regular may have contributed to the relative irrele-
vance of the spatial encoding process. Alternatively, the two
effects may have different time courses, with spatial encoding only
affected early in the blink period, after which it recovers quickly.
The inhibitory process, on the other hand, may be affected in a
later stage and recover more slowly. Because we measured probe
detection only after the blink period, we may have missed out on
any early spatial encoding deficits and measured only inhibitory
effects.
The absence of a spatial effect in Experiment 3a also opens the
possibility that part of the inhibition in visual marking is actually
not linked to individual locations. Instead, inhibition may be
applied to various nonspatial representations. As mentioned in the
beginning of this article, recent studies on visual marking have
suggested that inhibition may be linked to properties other than
location. For instance, Watson and Humphreys (1998) have shown
that when moving, green distractors are being ignored, newly
appearing green distractors also fail to interfere with search. Re-
cent experiments in our lab have confirmed this finding further
with static displays. Singleton distractors, presented in the new set,
became less interfering the more they resembled the old items
(Olivers & Humphreys, 2001b). This suggests that some inhibition
is being transferred from old to new items on the basis of shared
properties. Watson and Humphreys (1998) proposed that for some
displays, inhibition may be feature based, for example, applied to
an entire color map. Any item exhibiting that feature will then be
effectively ignored. If location information is difficult to maintain
(as with complex motion displays), then feature-based inhibition
may be the only means available for ignoring distractors (Olivers
et al., 1999). If old and new items cannot be distinguished by a
single feature, then location-based inhibition is more appropriate,
and if both types of information are available, then either or both
can be used as appropriate representations for the inhibitory pro-
cess to act on. We tested this hyphothesis in Experiment 4.
Experiment 4: Further Support for Nonspatial Inhibition
In Experiment 4 we adopted a somewhat different procedure to
measure the amount of inhibition remaining after distractors had
been presented inside or outside the blink. As outlined in Figure
11, trials were largely the same as in Experiment 2c: They started
with an RSVP stream containing a T1 target, followed by a
preview display containing green Hs, followed by a search
display containing blue A distractors and a blue H target.
Participants had to localize the target in a pointing display,
which in turn was followed by the cue to identify T1. The
difference between the studies lay in the addition of a second
4 We thank Adriane Seiffert for pointing this out.
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search display just after the T1 response was given. This second
search display consisted of green As and a green H target, which
had to be localized just like the blue H. We hypothesized that
the more effectively the green Hs are suppressed in the preview
displays, the slower the detection of the green H target in the
second search display should be. Thus, previewed green Hs
presented outside the attentional blink should lead to better
selection of the blue H target in the first search display but to
worse selection of the green H target in the second search
display. In contrast, green Hs presented inside the blink should
lead to worse selection of the first target but better selection of
the second target.
We also varied the spatial layout of the second search dis-
play. In the same-location condition the items fell in exactly the
same positions as the previewed items, whereas in the different-
location condition the items were positioned at random. This
manipulation was added in an attempt to differentiate further
between location-based and object- or feature-based effects. If
the inhibition in visual marking is (partly) location based, then
any differential blink effects may be expected to be greater in
the same-location condition than in the different-location
condition.
Note that our procedure resembles that of the negative priming
paradigm. In the negative priming paradigm a target on trial n may
have been a distractor on trial n  1, and typically a cost is
observed relative to an unrelated previous distractor. This cost has
been attributed to inhibitory processes operating on the distractor
(e.g., Tipper, 1985). We return to possible links between visual
marking and negative priming later.
Method
Participants. Twenty-one participants (2 male and 19 female, includ-
ing 5 left-handed and 16 right-handed) participated for either course credits
Figure 11. Part of the procedure of Experiment 4. The sequence of events was exactly the same as in
Experiment 2c except for appearance of the second search display (Step 7). This display consisted of green A
distractors and a green H target (identical to the green Hs in the preview display, Step 3). In the same-location
condition, the second search items appeared in the same locations as the previewed items. In the different-
location condition, they appeared in randomly selected different locations. RSVP  rapid serial visual
presentation; T1  first target letter; SOA  stimulus onset asynchrony.
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or money. The average age was 20.5 years (range  17–29 years).
Participants were a priori excluded from analyses if they had noticed the
spatial relationship between the preview display and the same-location
condition of the second search set. Without this rule there would be the risk
that observers may have used the preview display as a cue for the second
search display because it carried information about the possible target
position. Only one participant was substituted because of this.
Stimulus, apparatus, design, and procedure. Equipment, stimuli, and
setup were identical to that in Experiment 2c. The design and procedure
were also very similar, with a few exceptions. As in Experiment 3, there
was no single-task baseline, there were only two SOAs—117 ms (inside
blink) and 936 ms (outside blink)—and there was only one display size
(12). Furthermore, the stimulus sequence was extended with a second
search display, which occurred after the T1 letter was entered. For this
purpose, the T1 response display was followed by a 750-ms blank display.
Subsequently, a fixation cross would appear for 500 ms, followed by the
second search display. The new display thus seemed like a new trial with
a new display. The second search display consisted of green box-shaped A
distractors together with a green H target, which participants again had to
localize by clicking a mouse button and then pointing to the target’s
position in a separate pointing display. Unpublished experiments in our lab
have shown that preview effects may last for at least 2.5 s, warranting our
expectation that some inhibition may transfer to the second search task,
which was presented relatively long after the initial preview. The layout of
the second search set was varied so that the items fell in the same positions
as the previewed distractors (same-location condition) or in randomly
selected different positions (different-location condition). The second
search display timed out after 5 s. If an error was made during any of the
three stages of the trial (first search task, T1 report, or second search task),
then the trial was repeated by random insertion in the remainder of the
block. Participants first practiced the task in stages and then completed one
block of at least 100 correct trials. Of these 100 trials, 50 contained a
preview display presented inside the blink and 50 contained a preview
display presented outside the blink. In each blink condition, 25 displays
were followed by a second set of search items in the same location as in the
preview, and 25 were followed by items in a different location. All
conditions were randomly mixed.
Results
RTs. Figure 12 shows the RT data for each SOA and task. The
recursive clipping procedure resulted in 2.4% of the data points
being removed. An ANOVA with SOA (inside blink, outside
blink) and task (first-set search; second set, same location; and
second set, different location) as factors revealed significant main
effects of SOA, F(1, 20)  4.5, MSE  3,577, p  .05, and task,
F(2, 40) 16.2, MSE 17,028, p .001. RTs were faster overall
when preview distractors were presented outside the blink, and
performance on the second-set search was faster overall than
performance on the first-set search. There was also a significant
Task SOA interaction, F(2, 40) 19.4, MSE 3,931, p .001.
As can be seen from Figure 12, performance on the visual marking
task improved with increasing SOA, whereas it deteriorated on the
second search task. To test this interaction further, the analyses
were split into a t test (Fisher’s LSD) for the visual marking task
(first set) and a two-way SOA (inside, outside)  Spatial Layout
(same, different) ANOVA for the second-set search. The t test
confirmed the finding that RTs for the first set improved when
distractors were moved outside the blink (Ms  875 vs. 754 ms),
t(20)  4.80, p  .001. Most important, the ANOVA confirmed
that performance on the second-set search deteriorated with SOA
(Ms  661 vs. 688 ms, averaged across spatial layout), F(1, 20) 
6.6, MSE 2,251, p .02. However, there was no effect of spatial
layout, nor was there a reliable Spatial Layout  SOA interaction
( ps  .53).
Errors. Figure 12 suggests that the error pattern followed the
RTs closely. This was confirmed by a correlation of .96 between
the RTs and error percentages. An ANOVA pointed toward a
reliable effect of task, F(2, 40)  5.0, MSE  20, p  .01. More
errors were made on the visual marking task than on the second
search task. No other effects were significant ( ps  .20).
Discussion
Experiment 4 replicates and extends the findings of Experiment
3. Moving the green H distractors outside the blink improved the
detection and localization of a blue H target but led to decreased
performance associated with the green H itself. In Experiment 3
this was measured through detection of a dot presented on one of
the green Hs; in Experiment 4 this was measured through the
detection and localization of the green H in an additional search
display at the end of each trial. Search for a green H was on
average 27 ms slower when old, green H distractors had previously
been presented outside the blink relative to inside the blink. Thus,
the results of Experiment 4 indicate once more that old distractors
are inhibited and that this inhibition is affected by removing
attentional resources.
In addition, the modulation was no weaker (if anything, it was
a bit stronger) when the displays in the second search task had a
different layout than that of old distractors in the first search task,
relative to when they had identical spatial layouts. We therefore
conclude that at least part of the inhibition is not tied to the old
distractor locations. Instead, suppression may be linked to nonspa-
tial object properties such as color or object identity.
Note again, though, that the failure to find any effects of spatial
layout does not mean that there is no inhibition tied to old distrac-
tor locations. Our measure may simply not have been sensitive
enough to measure location-based suppression. For instance, the
abundant occurrence of blank as well as filled screens (e.g., the
pointing and T1 response displays) between the preview and
second search displays may well have wiped out any location-
Figure 12. Reaction times (RTs) and error percentages for Experiment 4.
Set 1 VM  search results of the visual marking displays; Set 2 Same 
search results of the second set with the same spatial layout as the preview;
Set 2 Different  results for second search displays but with different
spatial layouts than the preview. Error bars represent one standard error.
SOA  stimulus onset asynchrony.
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based suppression (cf. Horowitz & Wolfe, 1998; Takeda & Yagi,
2000; Watson & Humphreys, 1997). Alternatively, location-based
suppression may be only short-lived and may even turn into
facilitation. For instance, observers may develop an implicit mem-
ory trace for the display layout, which helps them in finding the
target in a later stage when search items are presented in identical
layouts (cf. Chun & Jiang, 1998). The longer the preview display
is presented outside the blink, the better the implicit memory trace
and the more facilitation results from it. The lack of an effect of
spatial layout in our displays could thus be due to a mixture of
facilitation and inhibition.
As in the negative priming paradigm, here the second search
target was presented on what could be seen as a separate trial, and
it was related to the previewed distractors. The difference between
this and the typical negative priming task is that here the target and
distractor were always related, and the strength of the adverse
effect of previous distractors was modulated by the attentional
blink. The relationship between the present results and those
obtained with negative priming opens the interesting possibility
that part (but not all; see Watson & Humphreys, 1997) of the
inhibitory processes involved in visual marking may be the same
processes operating under negative priming conditions. In further
support of this, studies of negative priming have shown that the
inhibition can be, at least partially, object based (e.g., Tipper,
Brehaut, & Driver, 1990) and that it is susceptible to attentional
load (Lavie & Fox, 2000). We return to this point in the General
Discussion.
General Discussion
We used the attentional blink as a tool to investigate two
important aspects of visual marking: (a) whether visual marking
involves the top-down inhibition of old items and (b) whether this
inhibitory mechanism requires attentional resources. The present
experiments provided evidence for both.
Experiment 2c showed that presenting old distractors inside an
attentional blink led to their subsequently being included in the
search set. Gradually moving the distractors outside the blink
period resulted in more and more efficient search through the new
set. Since the new set was presented only after participants had
recovered from the attentional blink (400–500 ms, as confirmed by
the control conditions of Experiments 2a and 2b), we concluded
that the attentional blink must have taken away important re-
sources from the old items—resources, we hypothesized, that are
necessary to actively inhibit distractors in anticipation of the
search set. Experiment 2 thus demonstrated the task constraints
operating on visual marking. When the visual system is highly
occupied with a secondary task, it postpones or abolishes the setup
and/or utilization of an inhibitory template. Therefore, items that
would normally be ignored remain active and have an adverse
effect on visual search through new items. Experiment 3a showed
a reversed effect. If the task is to detect a dot on a minority of trials
and this dot appears on one of the old items, then its detection and
localization suffers relative to dots presented on new items. How-
ever, presenting the old items inside the blink has an advantageous
effect: Subsequent dot detection improves for old items. When the
task changes and dots are detected on every trial, the difference
between old and new items disappears completely (Experiment
3b). This provides further support for the involvement of inhibitory
processes, which are subject to top-down settings and limited-
capacity resources. Furthermore, because Experiment 3 involved
the explicit localization of the probe dot, the results suggest that,
within our model of visual marking, the attentional blink affects
the inhibitory stage more than the spatial representation stage.
Experiment 4 provided evidence that the inhibition of old dis-
tractors has at least a strong feature- or object-based component
and is not tied solely to old distractor locations. Previewed dis-
tractors presented outside the attentional blink led to slower search
times and more errors when they became the target of a search task
presented shortly after, regardless of whether the search display
had the same spatial layout as the preview display. These results
suggest that some of the inhibition may be object-, feature- or
identity-bound, in accordance with earlier studies on negative
priming and on visual marking with moving items.
These experiments offer strong support for large parts of our
model of visual marking (Figure 1). In anticipation of relevant
target information, irrelevant distractors are inhibited. Further-
more, this inhibition is task dependent and resource limited, as-
pects which are indicative of a top-down process. However, evi-
dence for the location-based implementation of the inhibition has
been rather thin. Experiment 3 suggested that the spatial represen-
tation of the distractors was less affected than their suppression,
and Experiment 4 failed to demonstrate stronger inhibition for
spatially identical layouts relative to different layouts. Possibly,
location-based inhibition does not play as strong a role as we
envisaged, and other types of inhibition may be equally, or more,
important (cf. Olivers et al., 1999; Watson & Humphreys, 1998).
Alternatively, the attentional blink may not affect spatial coding at
all, or may affect it only in an early stage of the blink, allowing for
the spatial representation to be recovered before we are able to
measure any detrimental effects (notice that the dot detection and
second search tasks in Experiments 3 and 4 were always presented
relatively late). It is interesting to note that, in a somewhat differ-
ent experiment, we did find effects of the attentional blink on
spatial encoding (Olivers & Humphreys, 2001a). Instead of a
visual marking task, we used a spatial cuing task in which we gave
participants a brief and masked preview of the future locations of
the target set rather than the distractor set (as in the normal preview
paradigm). The mask was introduced to prevent recovery of spatial
processing later during the blink. The preview consisted of a
variable number of cues and therefore varied in its predictability of
the target positions (i.e., the more cues, the more uncertainty about
the target position). We measured the observers’ capacity to pro-
cess and retain these cues across the blink period and found that,
on average, spatial capacity was halved inside the attentional blink.
Apparently, taking away attentional resources results in cues not
being appropriately tagged, or it limits their access to VSTM.
Similar spatial processing restrictions may operate on visual mark-
ing under attentional blink conditions. Our main conclusion there-
fore is that inhibitory effects are present and they are under
top-down control. Whether the buildup of a spatial representation
is equally under top-down control remains an issue for further
investigation.
Implications for the Attentional Blink
Our results are also important with respect to the attentional
blink. Several studies combining priming and RSVP have shown
that non- or misidentified items presented inside the blink can still
facilitate processing of identical or related targets at a later stage (a
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positive priming result; Luck, Vogel, & Shapiro, 1996; Maki,
Frigen, & Paulson, 1997; Shapiro, Driver, Ward, & Sorensen,
1997). Maki et al. (1997), using a semantically related prime,
showed that the strength of priming did not alter with increasing
lag between T1 and the prime. In other words, the prime was as
effective when presented inside the blink as when presented out-
side the blink. The present experiments address a closely related
issue, as we asked to what extent items inside the blink still
interfere with, rather than facilitate, subsequent target processing.
As suggested earlier, Experiment 4 (and, to a certain extent,
Experiment 3) can especially be regarded as manipulating a form
of negative priming, as previously presented distractors resulted in
slower search times when they became targets. In contrast to Maki
et al., we found that these adverse effects were strongly modulated
by the strength of the attentional blink. Distractors presented inside
the blink resulted in more interference than distractors presented
outside the blink. This suggests that the attentional blink may
allow for a considerably high level of representation of stimuli
(leading to facilitation even on the semantic level) but that the
suppression of these representations is severely affected. This may
mean that the inhibitory mechanisms are either operating in an
even later stage in the visual stream or are generated elsewhere and
thus operate externally on visual processing.
The priming studies strongly suggest that items presented within
the attentional blink period are active and that the blink allows for
considerable amounts of processing. As a consequence, distractors
presented inside the blink remain active too. However, there is
another possibility. Perhaps items do not become active inside the
blink but are simply put on hold until the blink is over (Chun &
Potter, 1995; see below), and only then do they lead to facilitation
or interference. Thus, instead of stating that the old distractors
stayed active, it is perhaps safer to conclude that they were not
successfully deactivated. Future research will be necessary to
address these questions.
There are further implications for models of the attentional
blink. One such model is the VSTM interference model of Ray-
mond and colleagues (Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1995; Shapiro
& Raymond, 1994). According to this account, the attentional
blink is caused by too many items entering VSTM, including T1,
T2, and often the intermediate distractors. The items within VSTM
will compete for response retrieval, a competition usually won by
T1 because of its status as the first task and its distinctive color. As
a consequence, T2 retrieval will suffer. One prediction from the
interference account is that the more items enter VSTM, the
stronger the interference will be, and hence the greater the costs
associated with the attentional blink. Isaak, Shapiro, and Martin
(1999) found evidence in favor of this prediction, be it only on the
conceptual level rather than on the feature level (i.e., letter dis-
tractors interfered more with letter targets than did nonletter dis-
tractors even though the nonletters were visually more similar).
The VSTM interference model appears, at least in part, to be
compatible with our results. Much of the interference from the
previewed distractors may be caused by too many distractors
gaining access to VSTM, resulting in interference with target
selection. On the other hand, within our current model of visual
marking, some attentional processing (and thus access to VSTM)
of the old items may actually be required for the inhibitory tem-
plate to be set up, and the more old distractors enter VSTM, the
more they can be deprioritized. Also, it is most likely that the
interference from the old distractors occurs on a feature level
rather than on a conceptual level, contrary to what Isaak et al.
(1999) found. Finally, in our experiments, T2 was replaced by a
preview display to which no response was required. Hence, it is
unlikely that there was any competition for response retrieval
within VSTM during the blink period.
Instead, our data seem most consistent with a simpler and more
general model outlined by Shapiro, Arnell, and Raymond (1997),
combining aspects of many other models of the attentional blink
(Chun & Potter, 1995; Jolicoeur, 1998; Jolicoeur & Dell’Acqua,
1998; Seiffert & Di Lollo, 1997). Here we quote the first two
tenets of this unified model:
(1) As a result of the T1 mask, increased attention is required to
enable T1 to reach a level of awareness sufficient for report.
(2) As less attention is available for T2, by virtue of T1’s demands,
T2 cannot be consolidated into a durable storage sufficient for report.
This leaves T2 vulnerable to decay and/or object substitution from a
variety of stimulus sources. . . . In spite of the inability to report T2
with a high degree of accuracy during this interval, T2 is processed to
a level of semantic awareness. (Shapiro et al., 1997, p. 293)
In our experiments, too, T1 takes up most of the attentional
processing. Post-T1 stimuli may be processed up to the semantic
level (cf. the negative priming aspects of Experiment 4), but too
few attentional resources are available too late to inhibit the old
items. When resources are released again, the new items are due to
arrive, and both old and new will be selected together. As a
consequence, search is slowed.
Selective Attention and Resource Limitations
One of the major findings in the present study was that the more
the attentional system is engaged with the RSVP task, the more
irrelevant information will subsequently interfere with visual
search. On the surface this conclusion seems to stand in contrast to
earlier proposals by Lavie (Lavie, 1995; Lavie & Cox, 1997; Lavie
& Tsal, 1994), who suggested the opposite: The more attention is
involved in a perceptual task, the less irrelevant information will
interfere. Lavie and Tsal (1994) proposed that the capacity avail-
able for visual processing will determine the locus of attentional
selection. When observers are engaged in a task with low atten-
tional load, they will have resource capacity to spare. Lavie (1995)
suggested that this spare capacity must be spent and will inadver-
tently be directed toward distractors, which may in turn interfere
with the central task. In contrast, with a very demanding task, all
attentional capacity will be used up, leaving no resources for
distractors (Lavie, 1995; Lavie & Cox, 1997). In our experiments
we found the opposite result. The more observers were engaged in
the RSVP task, the stronger the distractors subsequently interfered
with search.
However, our results are by no means incompatible with Lavie’s
(1995) hypothesis. First, assuming that the RSVP task does indeed
impose a perceptual load on the system, there remains one obvious
difference between our procedure and Lavie’s (1995), namely, the
temporal order of the displays. The perceptual load hypothesis
appears especially powerful when targets and distractors are pre-
sented simultaneously. In this case, if the target requires more
processing, the distractors receive less processing. In a typical
preview procedure, however, the target information appears only
after the distractors. In this case, efficient processing of the target
crucially depends on the distractors already having been processed
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first. If this preprocessing is prevented by a central task (e.g., the
RSVP task employed here), then both distractor and target sets will
receive a share of attentional processing during search.
Our results are even better reconciled with Lavie’s (1995)
hypothesis if we assume, as suggested earlier, that the RSVP task
does not so much impose a perceptual load on the visual system,
but more a central, cognitive load, affecting working memory (see,
for instance, Vogel & Luck, 1999, for physiological evidence).5
Lavie, in a 2000 review, proposed that working memory is needed
to
maintain current priorities and thus ensure that low-priority items can
be suppressed. Contrary to the predicted effect for perceptual load,
however, increasing the load on these higher mental functions will
drain the capacity available for active control and result in more,
rather than fewer, intrusions from irrelevant distractors. (pp. 175–176)
This idea fits well with our present findings and supports the
hypothesis that visual marking involves the top-down controlled
suppression of distractors. Lavie (2000) further argues that such
top-down control of selective attention within working memory is
likely to reside (at least in part) in the frontal lobes (cf. Kastner &
Ungerleider, 2000). We recently conducted a functional magnetic
resonance imaging study on visual marking, which showed, among
other areas, increased activation in the bilateral prefrontal cortex,
around the middle frontal gyri and superior frontal sulci (Brod-
mann Areas 6 and 8; frontal eye fields), and in right superior
parietal areas (Brodmann Area 7). These areas have previously
been attributed with the functions of spatial working memory and
the top-down modulation of spatial selection in attention (Corbetta
et al., 1998; Courtney, Petit, Maisog, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 1998;
Haxby, Petit, Ungerleider, & Courtney, 2000; Kastner, Pinsk, De
Weerd, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 1999; Rowe, Toni, Josephs,
Frackowiak, & Passingham, 2000). It is therefore possible that
exactly these areas are affected by the attentional blink, resulting
in a loss of inhibition. In further support of this idea, Marois, Chun,
and Gore (2000) also found a right frontoparietal pattern of acti-
vation under attentional blink conditions.
5 We thank Yuhong Jiang for pointing this out.
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